Report Sample

Academic Report Sample


 US-Afghan end game  2014 and implications for Pakistan

Table of content:
1.      History and background of Afghanistan                                                                    
2.      Civil wars in Afghanistan                                                                                          
3.      Soviet War and Mujahedeen in Afghanistan                                                             
4.      Origin of Taliban in Afghanistan                                                                                
5.      Al-Qaeda and its growth                                                                                          
6.      Founding principles of Al-Qaeda                                                                              
7.      Pakistan-Afghanistan relations                                                                                  
8.      Transition in the Afghanistan-Pakistan war                                                                
9.      Prospects for Stability in Pakistan                                                                             
10.  Clear and Future Danger to Pakistan from Afghanistan                                            
11.  What withdrawal will lead to us                                                                               
12.  American Policies against Afghanistan                                                                     
13.  September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom                                        
14.  U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure                                                        
15.  USAID and Other Investments                                                                               
16.  Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy                            
17.  Rebuilding Afghanistan – US Involvements Result                                                  
18.  Economic Effects on US Due to War                                                                     
19.   Reference                                                                                                             


History and background of Afghanistan:

Culture, Ethics, Language, Government and Policies in Afghanistan:
Everything in afghanistan is influenced by history and previous rulers. As Arabs were the most powerful rulers here and they spread inslamic religion in this country therefore cutlure introduced by them is still followed by people in Afghanistan.  In different times different ways were adopted to govern this country and its people including republic, autocracy and communist etc, but rules followed here are based on Islamic legislations always.
People in Afghanistan were collection of different regions in beginning; therefore language was becoming a problem for them at that time. But after arrival of Arab rulers in this region, combination of languages excluded from here and some common languages got rise here. Most of the people here learn Persian and Pashto, and these two languages are counted as two official languages in Afghanistan today. In different provinces there, still Balochi, Pashai and Hindi are used as mother language.
When we talk about ethical groups founded in Afghanistan from decades, then Pashtun, Uzbek, Aimak, Bloch, Hindu, Hazar and Tajik appears as most powerful and prominent groups. These groups were not part of Afghanistan in history, but are associated with different areas of this region till date. The most common reason of popularity of these groups is working of people in form of tribes, which is followed today as well. (Ahmadi, Afghanistan's human and physical geography 2009)

Civil wars in Afghanistan:
The road to war in Afghanistan was not really straight; this was actually results of different modern literatures. Contribution to it was made by government and some eternal forces, and this simple and peaceful protest turned out as war in this country. Problem started here with low rate of payments which were made to government employees in Afghanistan, this leads the country towards financial corruption and it spread all over the country in limited period of time. Its bad consequences were not just noticed by lay men there, but military officers in Afghanistan as well face some deadly consequences. This thing influenced young Pushtuns to search for new ways to get financial stability and close all the connection of royal families.  
Nation of Afghanistan realised there weakness most in 1922 when they were stuck in famine and state was unable to help them out in this situation. Ministry of agriculture in Kabul humiliated afghan people at that time instead of supporting them. (Maley 2002)
 This differentiation between people of different states becomes a reason of failure for new democracy in this country. It was very surprising for Zahir Shah who was prime minister there at that time, as he never expects that nation which stands against his policies in order to get their right. To overcome this situation at that time, Daoud becomes the leader of this country and fought for stabile and accurate way for about five years. He was a man of great qualities and was not manipulative like former prime minister; he was also part of royal family and take keen interest in betterment of this country and its situations. Changes brought by Daoud were not noticeable at that time by general afghan people but he was making improvements gradually which was striking for former ministers. Besides his noticeable efforts in politics, people there easily forget him and remove him from this post. In this period this country built largest prison of Asia. Three tactics lead this man to victory but his death in April 1978 ended everything there and closes all the doors for peace as well. (Maley 2002)

Soviet War and Mujahedeen in Afghanistan:

Soviet was took place in Afghanistan in 1979-89, here mujahedeen were opposing the government and its policies. Different parties try to solve this quell between them but none of them succeed in their efforts. Then on 25 Dec, 1979 USSR invaded Afghanistan to control the situation and appointed Babrak Karmal as president of this country. More than 102,000 troops were brought by U.S army here to control the situation of war and establish effective control inside and outside the Kabul. In order to oppose the Soviet installation by USSR, mujahedeen plan to build a secular state where they can live according to their will and polices. These mujahedeen were not just limited to Afghanistan at that time, there fellows were scattered all around the world, especially in neighbor countries. Some thoughts say that leaders of mujahedeen were living in Pakistan and were also backed by them and some other countries. To overcome this problem, U.S started his military assistance program in Afghanistan while at the same time Pakistan provided training and some financial aid to U.S army. All these efforts failed later on and in 1988 USA governor withdrawal troops from Afghanistan after losing 14,500 of them. Effects of this war were massive when we took notice about afghan people, and millions of them migrated to neighbor countries including Iran and Pakistan. Consensus of 1989 reported that Soviet war in Afghanistan resulted death of 1 million civilians there. (Monitors 2012)

In the post soviet period different groups of mujahedeen also fought with each other in order to consolidate power, but only same names appear as prominent on in the end. These names were Burhanuddin Rabbani, Mohammad Najibullah, Ahmed Shah Massoud, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rashid Dostum. Mujahedeen rule was begin by Dostum and his Uzbek militia in 1922, during this period of time power was also transferred to 51 person body for period of two months so that grounds of Afghanistan can be brought back to Islam and it becomes an Islamic state once again. After that in Dec 1992, Rabbani become president and did not notice any of activities of Taliban in this country. He ruled this country for almost 4 years but progress was not monitored regarding situation or stabilization of this country. (Monitors 2012)

Origin of Taliban in Afghanistan:

During fight with mujahedeen a new group emerged to oppose the government and royal kingdom of Afghanistan, this was the group of Taliban. This group was started by Mullah Muhammad Omar, he was part of a strong tribe in Ghilzai and member of Pashtun family. He comes forward with a pure goal to establish Islam in this state but the why that he chose was not ethical as it becomes a reason of death for millions of civilians later on. In 1994, first movement by Taliban was made and they succeed in it as well. Under this movement they peacefully capture Kandahar and later on they moved to Ghazni and Herat in 1995. The strongest decision made by them was in 1996 to capture Kabul, it did not seem tough to them after victory of peaceful capture of other three regions.

Afterwards he started a new regime and named Afghanistan as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They adopted Shari'a Law and banded all other rules previously followed, it was attempted to improve security conditions there. Among civilians, especially women and girls suffer badly because of Taliban’s fundamental beliefs and rules which later on contributed in economic deprivation as well. U.S army once again started their movement to control this situation and formed Northern Alliance which is Rabbani as their center of all activities. This step limited the activities of Taliban till 1997 but in 1998, this group comes forward once again with Mazar-i-Sharif, who established dominance of Taliban over 90 percent of the country. He was the one under whose commands were to find refuge in Uzbekistan few days before attacks on world trade center. (Monitors 2012)

Al-Qaeda and its growth:

Al-Qaeda begins in late 1990’s and is working actively till date. With passage of time this network is growing bigger and bigger. This network started working actively after getting inspired by terrorism at time of Soviet war in Afghanistan. Notice of this group was taken at first by U.S army and government and they tried hard to dismiss these troops from afghan territories. At that time CIA launched a program named as Operation Cyclone; it was channeled through Pakistan so that afghan mujahedeen surrender and agree to live peacefully. (Riedel 2010)

Ideology followed by Al-Qaeda from time of its beginning was development of Islamic movement and with that revival of Islam in this region. Many scholars debated that Al-Qaeda is not a part of Muslim world as they have adopted war as their way to achieve their goal, while Islam is a religion of peace and terror is not a part of this religion. They also argue on the fact that members of Al-Qaeda are not preaching the right thing, as they have lack of knowledge about Shari'a laws and meaning of real jihad.  To clear their purpose and goal leader of this group conducted a media campaign in mid of 1990’s, this was just the beginning for them to expose themselves.

As afterwards they carry on this way of communication and faxed their statements, audio recordings and some video appearance with some internet posts. Analysts concluded that these efforts were made by Al-Qaeda to elicit psychological reactions of global audience, especially people in Islamic world and Muslims in U.S or Europe. Messages by this group were always signaled to provide information about their new attacks and operations. To understand ideology of Leader of this group Usama Bin Ladin, his statements were considered as primary source. (Blanchard 2007)

Founding principles of Al-Qaeda:

During period of Soviet war Bin Laden experienced role of logistical coordinator and a financier for people living in Afghanistan and Arab countries, as he provided them with help and support in their believes of setting Islamic principles in this country.  From that time Al-Qaeda is associated with building common Islamic principles which were named as jihad later on. After the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, Bin laden expressed his opposition towards military forces of Saudi Arabia; its reason was their support to U.S army and other Non-Muslim troops. In 1991, gulf war causes defensive jihad by Bin Ladin and this group raise voices against all non-Muslim forces.

At that time first call was made for jihad to secure withdrawal of U.S troops at all cost. Bin laden was upset due to criticism of royal family of Saudi Arabia. This declaration also cited massacres in other neighbor countries and also raised war in those countries. Worst step taken by Al-Qaeda was attack of September 11, 2001 on America. This attack was counted as second worst attacks of this country as it was marked most violent day with 2,793 deaths. Besides lives of civilians, financial loss of $100 billion was recorded here. This loss put negative influence on economy in terms of lower profits, at some points it is also said that more than $2 trillion were loss in profits. (Blanchard 2007)

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations:

On September 12, 2001, U.S Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage made a series of unilateral demands on Pakistan. The head of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) General Mahmood Ahmad pleaded with him to reconsider, stating, “You have to understand history.” “No,” Armitage responded, “History begins today.” (Armitage 2006)

Present day relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are serious matter of concern, especially after killing laden in Pakistan by U.S armed forces. This leave an unsolvable question on modern state system of Pakistan and everyone is now looking at Pakistan to get information about next movement of Al-Qaeda and its new leaders. Critics say that Pakistan is supporting Al-Qaeda in their mission and helping them financially as well. But if we take a look at past then we can easily identify that geographically, ethologically and historically context of poor relations has been monitored between these two regions.

Beginning of these clashes started in September 1947, when Afghanistan raises as only nation who oppose establishment of Pakistan. This debate was very first reason of damaging relations between these neighbor countries. After this Afghanistan the fellow Muslim country postures added complexities for Pakistan's leaders, and they face isolation and destruction in this state. When British transfered the power to Pakistani leader Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, at that time once again afghan government encouraged armed tribal incursion in tribal areas of Pakistan. This effort was made to weaken defense calculus on Eastern borders of Pakistan which were linked with India after partition of subcontinent.   

But Pakistan forget these thing and later on once again Pakistan supported Afghanistan by allowing it to use port of Karachi for purpose of link with international markets, but here as well they breach Pakistan and start looking for alternate trade outlets. Iran make offer to Afghanistan and they accepted it as well, this new relation turned Pakistan in full fledged economic blockade. All these targets were made by afghan government to damage Pakistan internally as well as in international markets. Its internal crises, international isolation, foreign policies and military weakness were goal of afghan government, but they could not succeed in their efforts at all.

Period of Sardar Muhammad Daud Khan was good time for Pakistan, as this prime minister consider religion and international constrains and opportunities vital than other things. He worked hard so that strategic benefits can be brought back to this region, meanwhile soviet war took place where china and Pakistan come closer to each other as they were agreed on same policies at that time. In 1955 when East Pakistan separated from this region and other remaining provinces were converted into single unit, at that time as well Afghanistan tried to play some cheap tactics. They claimed Pashtun areas to be a part of afghan region but this claim drew more visible lines around Pakistani borders for them. (Siddiqi n.d.)

Transition in the Afghanistan-Pakistan war:

Interests of U.S are always linked with Pakistan, as they are providing them a way to enter Afghanistan and with that NATO supply from boarders of Pakistan to Afghanistan. Pakistan’s aim is just to emerge as stable, pluralistic, modernized and prosperous country for its neighbors and within its boarder as well. Due to nuclear danger in south Asia now risk taking investments are also being made in Pakistan. U.S policy in Pakistan is providing little stability to Pakistan but it is also graving a threat between afghan and Pakistani boarders. Different Pakistani colonies are affecting on situation between Afghanistan and Pakistan like Pakistani military and security services; the country's civilian political leadership; its business communities and civil society; and the Pakistani public. (Coll 2009)

U.S and ISAF has put emphasis on peace negotiation so that peacefully talks can be made with Taliban in Qatar. US has also promised that they will not consider Taliban as an enemy onwards, rather they will work in peace with them and reject all the violence in Afghanistan as well. For this purpose it was important to discuss everything aspect with Pakistani government as well, as everything that is happening in Afghanistan is influencing Pakistan as well. NATO supplies are made through Pakistani borders and it is effecting relations of these neighbor countries.

Figure 11: Progress in Afghan War

The worst part of Afghanistan begin neighbor of Pakistan was residence of Usama Bin laden in this region which come in front of all after US special force raid in Pakistan. This was a moment of great disguise for Pakistan, as this region was supporting U.S armed forces from very beginning against Taliban and mujahedeen. At present Pakistan military is showing willingness towards U.S army to use resources of Pakistan like supply routes and air space. This favor has been made just because Pakistanis want Taliban out of this country. This is forced because of suicidal attacks by Taliban in major cities of Pakistan. There are many signs to show that Pakistan will seek to exploit US and ISAF withdrawal, and will consider peace negotiation as major factor to get depth in Afghanistan and grow stronger than India. (Cordesman 2012)

Prospects for Stability in Pakistan:

Today European alliance forces are facing a critical issue more like a strategic challenge, and to tackle with this issue they must define some goals that they want to achieve in association with Pakistan. In this discussion important is issue of Afghanistan and impacts that Pakistan is facing just because of this region. As there is risk that afghan troops can damage security of Pakistani residents more than ever, therefore this country is now agreed in efforts of helping Afghanistan move towards transition. Pakistan is becoming a disruptive force for afghan people now instead of constructive, therefore there is no chance the Afghanistan can establish stable relations with Pakistan once again. If we take a look on benefits that U.S government can have from Pakistan in this war is that this nuclear power is a center of gravity between this war and it can prove a wild card for winning this war. Therefore U.S government is not willing to lose this golden opportunity.

Outcomes of Afghanistan situations in 2014 are expected to be controlled after completing all operations. This will secure pashtun areas in Pakistan as well and central government in Kabul will also get some benefits due to civil conflicts. For this era when war would come an end, it is expected that it will drift further towards leadership crisis produces an new leadership that actually begins to react to Pakistan’s internal problems rather than focusing on its own power, living in denial when it can, and exporting blame when it must. (Cordesman 2012)

Clear and Future Danger to Pakistan from Afghanistan:

When come to talk about threats that Pakistan is facing then list can goes on and on, as they have raise higher today and with passage of time they are increasing rapidly. As both countries are facing problems raised by Taliban so there are possibilities that one day Taliban from both sides of borders will join hand and its worst affects would be faced by Pakistani government and nation. Ashley Tellis has discussed all these dangerous in his article Pakistan’s Impending Defeat in Afghanistan. He has beautifully divided all considerations of a Pakistani in four parts.

He writes "The most likely consequence of the security transition is a protracted conflict between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban that continues long after coalition forces have ceased active combat operations."

"The more serious, though still middling, outcome of the security transition could be a de facto partition of Afghanistan arising from a steady increase in Taliban control that is limited to the Pashtun-majority areas in the southern and eastern provinces."

"The last and most dangerous potential outcome of the security transition in Afghanistan would be the progressive Taliban takeover of the south and east en route to a larger attempt to control all of Afghanistan."

These three dangers are mentioned by this so intelligently that none of us reject them, with that he further talk about outcome that Pakistan will face due to these dangers.

According to him "A cataclysmic conflict of this sort would be the worst kind of disaster for Pakistan... It would not just provoke major refugee flows...  It would also integrate the violence and instability currently persisting along Pakistan’s western frontier into a vast hinterland that opens up even greater opportunities for violent blowback into Pakistan itself...it would end up embroiling Pakistan in an open-ended proxy war with every one of its neighbors." (Tellis 2012)

What withdrawal will lead to us?

We have discussed every detail about Afghanistan and how it is affecting region of its neighbor countries including Pakistan. Afghan war indeed brings many dangers towards Pakistan including Taliban which are now dangerous part of this country, but afghan army is not too strong that it can defeat Pakistani armed forces. Pakistani borders are sealed and without permission of Pakistani government it is impossible to move in this country form any of the neighbor country. There are rare chances that afghan army can defeat it but if in any rare case this thing took place, then it would be tough for them to handle this country as its political, religious and cultural values are completely different from Afghanistan today. Although this is an Islamic state but with passage of time technology has infused in different sectors. Military itself is so powerful in Pakistan, that none of the army can fight with them easily. It is now a nuclear power; therefore it is not easy to withdraw the army from its borders easily.

American Policies against Afghanistan
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom
After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban when it refused a final U.S. offer to extradite Bin Laden in order to avoid military action. President Bush articulated a policy that equated those who harbor terrorists to terrorists Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002. Mujahid has reconciled with the current Afghan government, and serves as one of the deputy leaders of the 70-member High Peace Council on political reconciliation. Some Afghan sources refer to him by the name “Fahim Khan,” or “Marshal Fahim.”
U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure
Building the capacity of the Afghan government, and helping it develop economically, is primarily, although not exclusively, the purview of U.S. and international civilian officials and institutions. In line with the prioritization of Afghanistan policy, in February 2009, the Administration set up the position of appointed “Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan” (SRAP), occupied first by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, reporting to Secretary of State Clinton. Holbrooke died on December 13, 2010, and that office at the State Department has been led since February 2011 by Ambassador Marc Grossman.
At the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Ambassador Ryan Crocker replaced Karl Eikenberry on July 25, 2011, but departed in July 2012 and James Cunningham, the “deputy Ambassador” was named and confirmed by the Senate at the end of that month. There are separate Ambassador rank officials to manage U.S. economic assistance issues, to oversee Embassy operations, and to coordinate U.S. rule of law programs. Under various programs, U.S. civilian and coalition military personnel are assigned to various Afghan ministries in advisory capacities.
The U.S. Embassy has progressively expanded its personnel and facilities to accommodate the additional civilian hires and Foreign Service officers who have been posted to Afghanistan since 2009 as mentors and advisers to the Afghan government. U.S. officials say there are more than 1,300 U.S. civilian officials in Afghanistan up from only about 400 in early 2009. Of these at least 400 serve outside Kabul to help build governance at the provincial and district levels. That is up from 67 outside Kabul in 2009.
On February 7, 2010, in an effort to improve civilian coordination between the United States, its foreign partners, and the Afghan government, the powers of the NATO “Senior Civilian Representative” in Afghanistan were enhanced as UK Ambassador Mark Sedwill took office. This office works not only with U.S. military officials but with representatives of the embassies of partner countries and with a special U.N. Assistance Mission-Afghanistan (UNAMA, see Table 2). In April 2011 Sedwill was replaced by the former British Ambassador to Iran, Sir Simon Gass. Afghan Ambassador to the United States Sayed Tayib Jawad served as Ambassador from 2004 until his recall in August 2010. Then Deputy Foreign Minister Eklil Hakimi replaced him on February 23, 2011. (Katzman, 2012, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy)


USAID and Other Investments
The tables at the end of this report include U.S. funding for State Department and USAID operations, including Embassy construction and running the “Embassy air wing,” a fleet of twin-engine turboprops that ferry U.S. officials and contractors around Afghanistan. In a significant development attempting to signal normalization of certain areas of Afghanistan, in June 2010, Deputy Secretary of State William Burns formally inaugurated a U.S. consulate in Herat. The State Department spent about $80 million on a facility in Mazar-e-Sharif that was slated to open as a U.S. consulate in April 2012, but plans to open the facility have been delayed because of concerns about the security of the facility. A U.S. consulate there is considered an important signal of U.S. interest in engagement with the Tajik and Uzbek minorities of Afghanistan. Alternative locations are being considered, and consulates are planned for the major cities of Ernesto London.
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
In November 2010 contracts were announced for expansion of the U.S. Embassy ($511 million) and to construct the two consulates ($20 million for each facility). As discussed below, both cities were in the first tranche of areas to be transitioned to Afghan control. The United Nations is extensively involved in Afghan governance and national building, primarily in factional conflict resolution and coordination of development assistance. The coordinator of U.N. efforts is the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). It was headed during March 2010-December 2011 by Swedish diplomat Staffan de-Mistura, replacing Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide. Mistura formerly played a similar role in Iraq. Slovakian diplomat Jan Kubis replaced him in January 2012.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 of March 20, 2008, expanded UNAMA’s authority to strengthen cooperation between the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the Afghan government. In concert with the Obama Administration’s emphasis on Afghan policy, UNAMA is to open offices in as many of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces as financially and logistically permissible. The mandate of UNAMA, was renewed for another year on March 22, 2011, by Resolution 1974. As did Resolution 1917 the previous year, Resolution 1974 largely restated UNAMA’s coordinating role with other high-level representatives in Afghanistan and election support role, while referring to UNAMA’s role in facilitating the coming transition to Afghan leadership. UNAMA has always been involved in local dispute resolution and disarmament of local militias, but its donor coordination has never materialized because of the large numbers and size of donor-run projects in Afghanistan. Under a March 2010 compromise with Karzai, it nominates two international members of the five person Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), one fewer than the three it selected under the prior election law. (Katzman, 2012, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy)
UNAMA is also playing a growing role in engaging regional actors in Afghan stability. It was a co-convener of the January 28, 2010, and July 20, 2010, London and Kabul Conferences, respectively. Along with Turkey, UNAMA chairs a “Regional Working Group” to enlist regional support for Afghan integration. On donor coordination, UNAMA is co-chair of the joint Afghan-international community coordination body called the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), and is helping implement the five-year development strategy outlined in a “London Compact,” (now called the Afghanistan Compact) adopted at the January 31-February 1, 2006, London conference on Afghanistan. The priorities developed in that document comport with Afghanistan’s own “National Strategy for Development,” presented on June 12, 2008, in Paris.
The difficulties in coordinating U.N. with U.S. and NATO efforts were evident in a 2007 proposal to create a new position of “super envoy” that would represent the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO in Afghanistan. In January 2008, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon tentatively appointed British diplomat Paddy Ashdown as the “super envoy,” but Karzai rejected the appointment over concerns about the scope of authority of such an envoy and the issue was dropped. The NATO senior civilian representative post, discussed above, appears to represent a step in the direction of improved donor coordination in Afghanistan and streamlining of the foreign representative structure there.
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Security Policy, 2011-2014 “Transition, and Beyond”
The Obama Administration policy goal is to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for global terrorism, but the U.S. criteria for judging achievement of that goal have generally included the degree to which the Afghan government and security forces can defend the country, govern effectively, and develop economically. The U.S. security mission is in the process of changing from a combat leadership to a mentoring and “overwatch” role by mid-2013. Still, from 2011 until the completion of the security transition in 2014, the basic pillars of U.S. and NATO security strategy that have been in place since 2001 remain intact.
  
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Much of the information in this section is taken from U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), “Report on Progress
Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” April 2012.
http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf.
Ibid.; Moreau, Ron. “New Leaders for the Taliban.” Newsweek, January 24, 2011.
Rebuilding Afghanistan – US Involvements Result
Security in Afghanistan is challenged by several armed groups, loosely allied with each other. There has not been agreement about the relative strength of insurgents in all of the areas where they operate. The top commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen, told journalists in October 2011 that the numbers of insurgents may be far fewer than the 25,000 previously assessed. Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”) The core of the insurgency remains the Taliban movement loyal, for the most part, to Mullah Umar, who led the Taliban regime during 1996-2001. Heand many of his top advisers reportedly operate from Pakistan, probably the city of Quetta but possibly also Karachi, thus accounting for the term usually applied to Umar and his aides: “Quetta Shura Taliban” (QST). The exact level of Mullah Umar’s control over insurgent ranks is unclear, and little precise information exists on Mullah Umar’s remaining inner circle. In recent years, he has lost some of this top aides and commanders to U.S.-led military action or Pakistan arrests, including Mullah Dadullah, Mullah Obeidullah Akhund, Mullah Usmani, and Mullah Abdul Ghani Bradar. In mid-2012, an offshoot of the Taliban has undertaken several major attacks under the name “Mullah Dadullah Front.” Umar has been making appointments to replenish the QST leadership ranks. When his top deputy, Mullah Bradar, was arrested in Pakistan in February 2011, Umar replaced him with younger and reputedly hardline, anti-compromise leaders Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, a U.S. detainee in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba until 2007; and Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, a logistics expert. (Katzman, 2012, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy)
The Taliban has several official spokespersons at large, including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi and Zabiullah Mujahid, and it operates a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat” and publishes videos. Some experts believe that Umar and his inner circle blame their past association with Al Qaeda for their loss of power, and the death of Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden on May 1, 2011, has perhaps strengthened the arguments of those in the movement advocating distance from Al Qaeda. And, U.S. officials argue that security successes since 2011 are causing some Taliban

It is surprisingly difficult to get a meaningful estimate of the total cost of the Afghan conflict, total spending on Afghan forces and total spending on various forms of aid. More data are available on US efforts – which have dominated military and aid spending, but even these data present serious problems in reliability, consistency, and definition. Moreover, it is only since FY2012 that the US provided an integrated request for funding for the war as part of its annual budget request.  The data for the period before FY2009 are accurate pictures of the Department of Defense request, but there is only a CRS estimate of total spending the previous years.

This report addresses the cost to the US of the Afghan War from FY2000-FY2013. It provides estimates of total cost, cost to the Department of Defense, and aid costs to State, USAID, and other federal agencies. It also reports on the total cost of international aid when this takes the form of integrated aid to Afghan development and Afghan forces – a fraction of total aid spending. No reliable estimate exists of total international aid to Afghanistan, since so much of this aid has been direct and has not passed through the Afghan Central government.

The resulting figures provide important insights for “transition.” They show the scale of past US efforts, how the aid has been allocated, and the differences between the total aid appropriated during the course of the war, the amount obligated (around 60% of the amount appropriated), and the amount actually disbursed (around 45% of the appropriation). (Katzman, 2012, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy)

 

Several points are clear:

·         The vast majority of aid went to the Afghan security forces and not development.

·         Most aid was very erratic in annual levels of effort, making it extremely difficult to plan the most effective use of the money and ensuring that program continuity was not possible.

·         The bulk of the total spending and aid has been allocated since FY2009, and came after the insurgency had reached high levels. It is a clear case of too much, too late.

·         The surge in aid spending creates the irony that the maximum actual cash flow –“disbursements” – is only occurring now that transition is in place and major cuts are coming between 2012 and 2014.

·         The data only tell the amount of money made available of a total category basis. They do not tell how much money actually reach Afghanistan, they do not tie spending to any clear objectives, they did not reflect any effective contracting and auditing system, and there are no measures of effectiveness or success.

This latter set of points is critical. No one who has served in government, or observed it, will ever claim that the ability to allocate and spend money is a measure of effectiveness. After more than a decade of war, this is in practice the total limit of Department of Defense, State Department and USAID reporting. The only exceptions are limited audit coverage by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR), reports by the GAO, and some audits by the inspector generals of given Departments. Not only did the money come far too late to prevent the rise of a major insurgency, when it did come, it came in areas where there were no effective overall planning,

Economic Effects on US Due to War

Cordesman: Going in Transition: US Military and Aid Spending: FY2002-2013 5/11/12 management, and contacting systems. No adequate fiscal controls and no real measures of effectiveness. The system virtually invited waste, fraud, and abuse. It is important to note that reforms have taken place in many areas of contracting, and there is now better auditing. The Afghan government has also promised important reforms in its control of spending and efforts to reduce corruption.

The fact remains, however, that if the CRS and OMB figures for FY2001-FY2013 that follow are totaled for all direct spending on the war, they reach $641.7 billion, of which $198.2 billion – or over 30% – will be spent in FY2012 and FY2013. This is an incredible amount of money to have spent with so few controls, so few plans, so little auditing, and almost no credible measures of effectiveness. It is also clear that the end effect has been to sharply raise the threshold of corruption in Afghanistan, to make transition planning far more difficult, and raise the risk that sudden funding cuts will undermine the Afghan government’s ability to maintain a viable economy and effective security forces. (Codesman,2012, The U.S. Cost of The Afghan)

 

 References

·         Anthony H. Cordesman, 2012, THE U.S. COST OF THE AFGHAN WAR: FY2002-FY2013

·         Kenneth Katzman, September 21, 2012, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

·         Siddiqi, Shibil, AfghanistanPakistan Relations: History and Geopolitics in a Regional and International Context

·         Armitage, Richard, 2006, Return of the Taliban

·         Blanchard, Christopher M.,2007, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology

·         Riedel, Bruce, 2010, The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future

·         Monitors, Conflict,2012, Conflict History:The Taliban 1994–2001

·         Maley, William, 2002, THE DECLINE OF STATE LEGITIMACY:1964-78

·         Ahmadi, Homayun, 2009Afghanistan's human and physical geography

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